Chapter 7: Establishment of the Franco Dictatorship
"Mola and the other leading conspirators had always been eager for Franco to play a major role in the revolt against the Popular Front, but there had never been discussion of anyone other than José Sanjurjo as primary leader. Though he was also senior to the main rebel chiefs, Sanjurjo's primacy was based on his leadership of the abortive 1932 revolt and was recognized by all the other conspirators. A plane was sent to fly him from his Lisbon exile to rebel territory on July 20. Its fiery crash on takeoff left Sanjurjo dead and the rebel movement without a leader.'"
"On July 19, after declaring martial law in Pamplona, Mola hastily re- edited his earlier political sketch for the new military directory. The new draft proposed a corporative economic administration, a system of cooperatives, and the continuation of a moderate program of agrarian reform. Freedom of education was to be generally permitted, but encouragement of “anarchy” and pornography were rigorously prohibited. Concerning religion, Molas memorandum stated: “We are Catholic, but respect the religious beliefs of those who are not. We believe that the Church ought to be separate from the State, for this benefits both institutions.’* "
"In accordance with Molas plans, some kind of patriotic junta—usually with civilian members or advisers in subordinate roles—was being set up in almost every province dominated by the rebels, but the real government in the insurgent zone was obviously the new self-appointed military hierarchy. "
"the bulk of their support came from the lower-middle and middle classes and the conservative north generally, so that the term Nationalist was soon understood to denote an affirmation of religion, tradition, and Spanish patriotism, with little of the radical connotation found in some other countries.
It was above all the outbreak of violent mass revolution in the Republican zone, with its church burnings, economic appropriations, and many thousands of murders, that quickly rallied the more conservative half of the Spanish population to the Nationalist cause. Almost equally important was the identification of the revolt with religion, which soon began to convert the revolt into an official crusade and provided its primary cultural, emotional, and spiritual support.
Representatives of the monarchy were kept at a distance. When Don Juan, third son of Alfonso XIII, slipped across the French border to volunteer for the Nationalist army, he was sent back again by Mola without being permitted to see any of the Junta members.” Mola also declined to receive other members of the royal family, including Air Force general Don Alfonso de Orleans-Bourbon, a cousin of the former king.' After a few weeks, the old monarchist flag was adopted throughout the Nationalist zone in place of the Republican banner, but this was the only symbol of identification with the monarchy.
The Burgos Juntas only firm plan seems to have been to maintain an all-military government, at least until the war was won. Administration was loose, and the Junta made no effort to govern the southern zone directly. The core of it was under the personal rule of Queipo de Llano, who administered all western Andalusia"
"In an interview with a Portuguese journalist on August 10, Franco declared categorically: “Spain is Republican and will continue to be so. Neither the regime nor the flag have changed. The only change will be that crime is replaced by order and acts of banditry by honest and progressive work.” Then he added more ominously, “Spain will be governed by a corporative system similar to those installed in Portugal, Italy, and Ger- many. © This distinction undercut much of the reassurance in Francos first remarks. Moreover, only five days later, at a major ceremony on the Feast of the Assumption (August 15) in Seville, Franco replaced the Re- publican flag with the traditional red and yellow banner of the monarchy, hailing it as the authentic flag of Spain for which patriots had given their lives in a hundred battles.
When asked privately by Kindelan if he really intended to work for a restoration, Franco replied that the return of the monarchy must be the eventual goal but could not be considered for the moment, for there were too many Republicans—or at least nonmonarchists—in the ranks of the Nationalist movement. Somewhat reassured, Kindelan insisted that a single unified command be created as soon as possible. Trusting Franco's discretion and knowing his qualities of leadership, he suggested that Franco be made commander in chief and also be named regent until it was possible to bring back the king. Franco, however, rejected the notion of a regency, saying that it would weaken the unity of the movement. Nor is there evidence that he was at first eager to have personal supporters work to install him as commander in chief of the Nationalist Army."
"From the beginning, foreign journalists as well as the German consul in Tetuán referred to Franco as the key leader of the rebel movement...Thus the first material supplied by Mussolini and Hitler was directed to Francos forces, and German and Italian contacts made it clear that they regarded Franco as the dominant Spanish commander. "
"Francos request for a meeting of a now-expanded Junta de Defensa to discuss the problem of a unified military command was readily accepted and scheduled for September 21, "
"General Cabanellas was clearly opposed, declaring that the question was premature and that it was possible to have a unified command without it being led by a single person, since there were two ways to direct a war: by a Generalissimo or by a Directory or Junta. I agreed, adding: “There are indeed two methods of directing a war: with the first you win, with the second you lose.” My proposal was finally put to a vote and was approved with only General Cabanellas dissenting."
"The Anuario Militar for 1936 listed Franco only twenty-third in seniority among major generals, and he was outranked in years of service by Cabanellas, Queipo, and Saliquet, yet no one else had as much combat experience and military prestige or as much political tact and influence abroad...Not only was Francos name the best known among the in- surgent generals, but it was less directly associated with political activity odious to moderate Spanish opinion. Mola was still remembered as the police chief of the dictablanda of 1930-31 and was now becoming known as “the Carlist general” because of the tens of thousands of Requetés flocking to the Army of the North."
"What had been agreed to, however, was only the naming of Franco as military commander in chief, not dictator or chief of state. The Junta de Defensa remained intact, nor was there a precise deadline for the as- sumption of powers. Several days passed without a word from Burgos, with no indication of any official announcement. Moreover, the post of military generalissimo alone was considerably less than Francos backers wanted. Together Nicolás Franco, Kindelan, Millán Astray, and Yagúe met with the general and convinced him to call forthwith another meeting of the Nationalist hierarchy, this time to clarify the powers of generalissimo and define his position as that of chief of state for as long as the war lasted."
"As officially published under Cabanellas's signature on September 29, it read: “In accordance with the resolution adopted by the Junta de Defensa Nacional, General Francisco Franco Bahamonde is named Chief of the Government of the Spanish State, and will assume all the powers of the new State.”"
"That night he delivered a longer radio speech, written by his legal aide, Martinez Fuset, which declared that “Spain would be organized under a broadly totalitarian concept of unity and continuity.” It promised “a regime of authority and hierarchy” that would be based on organic, corpo- rative representation and, “without being confessional,” would “respect the religion of the majority.”” It reiterated the nationalist and populist themes of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship—to that date Franco’s closest model—without specifically invoking the particular doctrines of either the monarchists, Catholics, Carlists, or Falangists, the principal civilian groups in the Nationalist zone. For the next thirty-nine years, Franco would claim that he had not sought power, but answering the call to “save Spain, had found authority thrust upon him by his colleagues. As witness to the purity of his mandate he could cite his earlier hesitation in seeking supreme power."
"Francos rule could never have succeeded had it not been immediately accepted by at least a sizable minority of the Spanish population, and indeed a majority within the original rebel zone. All Spaniards who felt threatened by the Popular Front—from upper-class monarchists to ordinary middle-class people to the smallholder peasants of the northern provinces—rallied to Franco as their leader in a desperate revolutionary struggle.
Though Franco and other rebel commanders had been careful to avoid attacking the basic principles of constitutional republicanism in the first days of the revolt, the outbreak of full revolution in the Republican zone stimulated an increasingly right-wing polarization under the Nationalist banners. By the autumn of 1936 the Nationalist zone not only had a new government but was undergoing a cultural counterrevolution of unprecedented proportions for any western country in the twentieth century. Religious revivalism was in full swing, at least on the public level, and nationalism was held to require the restoration of traditional values and attitudes on a remarkable scale. Schools and libraries were purged not only of radical but of nearly all liberal influences, and Spanish tradition was upheld as the indispensable guide to a nation that had lost its path by following the principles of the French Revolution and liberalism."